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which becomes Section 274(b) of the 1954 Code, denies a
deduction to the payor for any business gift in excess of
$25.00 per recipient. 4 As a result, a corporation will not
be able to deduct any payment which the widow-payee
may exclude as a gift under Section 102 of the Code. This
factor could weigh heavily in any decision by the Commissioner to limit litigation in this area.
BARRY D. BERmAN

Libel From Comment On Facts Generally Known
A. S. Abell Company v. Kirby'
Appellee, a member of the Rackets Squad division of
the Baltimore City Police Department, sued for malicious
defamation in the Circuit Court of Baltimore County. The
alleged libel appeared in the editorial section of THE
MORNING SUN, a Baltimore newspaper, in an article entitled
"Not Proved", which discussed current hearings before the
Baltimore City Delegation and the Governor for the possible dismissal of the Police Commissioner for incompetency and misconduct. In referring to some twenty-five
witnesses who testified not under oath or subject to crossexamination, the editorial incidentally mentioned the plaintiff as follows: "Every important witness against the Police
court at the same time. One exception, however, was Cooper's Estate,
T.C. Memo 1961-154 (1961). There, the Tax Court found that the payments "were not gifts to the widow, but were intended as additional
compensation for services previously rendered by the decedent. Such payments therefore were not excludable from income in the hands of the
widow as gifts, and they were deductible by the corporation." It seems
implicit in this wording that Judge Raum considered the same factors
in arriving at both conclusions. The opinion went on to state that, "We
do not reach the possible question whether the corporation might in any
event deduct the payment even if they should be held to be gifts."
""Gift" is defined, in the context of this section, as any item excludable under § 102 which is not excludable under any other section.
This means that an employer's payment to the widow of a deceased
officer which is excludable from her income as a gift under § 102 would
be deductible by the employer only to the extent of $25.00, whereas, if
the payment is excludable under § 101(b) as a death benefit, § 274(b)
does not apply to it. Oommibtee Report (Revenue Act of 1962) §
4, C, 3.
'227 Md. 267, 176 A. 2d 340 (1961), rehearing den. (1962).
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Commissioner, moreover, was a man with a motive. We
name especially the infamous Kirby, former Inspector...
and former Chief Inspector .. "2 Defendant pleaded the
general issue and attempted to show that the statement
was a fair comment on matters of legitimate public interest.3 At the trial defendant excepted to the failure of the
judge to permit the jury to consider in their determination
of the issue of fair comment, facts about plaintiff's recent
conduct in his official capacity as a justification of the use
of the term "infamous". 4 Though not printed in the editorial in question, or referred to therein, the defendant
claimed that they had been published in a number of
previous articles and were within the common knowledge
of the community. On appeal this decision was affirmed
(Judge Prescott dissenting in part), the Court of Appeals
ruling that, "To sustain fair comment, facts which are set
out in the publication must be truly stated (if they are unprivileged), and that such a fact which is not set out must
both be true and be so referred to in the publication as to
be either recognizable or be made identifiable, and easily
accessible." 5
According to the Restatement,' there are two general
classes of defenses to an action for defamation: (1) those
which afford protection from liability irrespective of the
purpose of the publisher or the manner of publication,
namely truthJ consent,' and absolute privilege; 9 and, (2)
those which afford protection only when the publication is
made for a proper purpose and is appropriate thereto,
namely conditional or qualified privilege which arises from
particular occasions,1" privileged criticism,1 ' as well as some
special types of conditional privilege. 2
Fair comment is an immunity which all courts recognize; however, there are two theories on which it is based.
Most classify it under the defense of privileged criticism"
2

Supra, n. 1, 271 (Emphasis added).
8 Under MD. RuLE 342c2(h), truth must be pleaded specially, but a general issue plea is sufficient to raise the defense of fair comment.
' These facts did go to the jury on the issue of malice.
5Supra, n. 1, 282.
0 RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1938) Scope note to Ch.25, p. 215.
' RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1938) § 582, p. 216.
8

1d., §§ 583-584.

pI4., § § 585-592
Id., §§ 593-605.
Ild., §§ 606-610.
-Id., §§ 611-612.
"Campbell v. Spottiswoode, 3 B. & S. 769, 32 L.J.Q.B. 185 (1863);
Dressler v. Mayer, 22 N.J. Super. 129, 91 A. 2d 650 (1952); Ullrich v.
N.Y. Press, 23 Misc. 168, 50 N.Y.S. 788 (1898).
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while a minority state that its existence precludes defamation.14 According to the majority, express malice destroys
the privilege; whereas, the minority holds that malice
brings the statement within actionable defamation. As the
Court points out in the Kirby case, this is a distinction of
little practical significance except on the burden of proof.1"
Fair comment may be defined as discussion, evaluation
or criticism, founded on facts, upon matters of legitimate
public interest, which is fair. 6 The privilege to comment
is available to every member of the public with no preferred position given to newspapers." It has long been
recognized as serving to encourage democratic discussion
and formation of opinion on matters of healthy interest to
the public."
In terms of the definition, the necessary elements constituting the defense of fair comment are as follows:
1. The matter complained of must be comment, not assertion of fact - If the jury finds the alleged defamation to
be a statement of fact, whether true or false, the defense
of fair comment is not applicable. In some cases the line
distinguishing fact from comment is readily seen. For
example, if the defendant states that plaintiff has robbed
a bank, and in his opinion this demonstrates low moral
character, it is obvious that the phrase "plaintiff has robbed
a bank" is fact and the remainder is comment thereon.
However, in many situations it is not easy to distinguish
between the two. What may be intended to be comment
may be phrased in terms of fact, or the two could be so
intermingled as to be practically indistinguishable. 9 In
the Kirby case the trial judge's instruction to the jury,
which is adopted by the Court of Appeals, is in the accepted manner: "Would an ordinary person, reading the
Brinsfield v. Howeth, 107 Md. 278, 68 A. 566 (1908) ; Gott v. Pulsifer,
122 Mass. 235, 23 Am. Rep. 322 (1877) ; Walker v. Hodgson [1909] 1 K.B.
239; Dakhyl v. Labourchere, [1908] 2 K.B. 325.
1z227 Md. 267, 272, 176 A. 2d 340 (1961) and see the Court's footnote;
see also Comment, Fair Comment, 8 Tex. L. Rev. 41, 41-43 (1930) ; as to
the burden of proof, see 1917 B Ann. Cas. 409, 414.
16RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1938) § 606, p. 275. See Anno. 155 A.L.R. 1346,
1349 (1945).
1 Negley v. Farrow, 60 Md. 158, 45 Am. Rep. 715 (1883); Snyder v.
Fulton, 34 Md. 128, 6 Am. Rep. 314 (1871) ; Foley v. Press Pub. Co., 226
App. Div. 535, 235 N.Y.S. 340 (1929) ; Campbell v. Spottiswoode, 3 B. & S.
769, 32 L.J.Q.B. 185 (1863).
"ITabart v. Tipper, 1 Camp. 350 (1808); Commonwealth v. Clap, 4
Mass. 163, 3 Am. Dec. 212 (1809).
Eikhoff v. Gilbert, 124 Mich. 353, 83 N.W. 110 (1900) ; RESTATEMENT,
TORTS (1938) § 606, subsection (1), comment b, p. 276. See also Comment,
Noel, Defamation of Public Offlcer8 and Candidates, 49 Col. L. Rev. 875,
878-880 (1949).
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matter complained of, be likely to understand it as an expression of the writer's opinion or as a declaration of an
existing fact?"20
2. The matter complained of must be one of legitimate
public interest - This includes a large number of situations " which may be roughly divided into two categories:
(a) topics involving matters inherently of interest to
the public, as governmental and quasi-governmental offices
and agencies, and those entrusted with their administration;
(b) situations in which persons by their voluntary actions have ceded their right of privacy and submitted themselves to public scrutiny. Whether or not a particular subject is of public interest and therefore proper for criticism
22
is a question of law.
3. The comment must be fair - This involves a number
of qualifications.
(a) The defendant may not impute corrupt or dishonorable motives to the plaintiff.2 3 Some courts hold this
is not a proper subject matter of public interest, while
others consider as a matter of law that it is a statement of
fact, therefore, not the proper subject of fair comment. 4
Most courts, then, impose liability regardless of which view
is taken unless the defendant can show justification.2" The
English view for many years has been more liberal. According to it such imputations are not permissable unless
they are the writer's honest opinion and are warranted by
the facts and in addition permit a reasonable man to draw
similar inferences.26 A few American jurisdictions have
adopted this rule,2 7 as has the Restatement.2 8
(b) The private character of an individual is not included in fair comment. - Fair comment does not allow
- 227 Md. 267, 274, 176 A. 2d 340 (1961) ; see also 1 HARPER AND JAMES,
THE LAW OF TORTS (1956) § 5.28, p. 457, n. 6.
1 See RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1938) § 606, subsection (1), comment a,
p. 276, and §§ 606-611, pp. 275-293; 33 Am. Jur. 156-167, Libel and Slander,
§§163-172; 53 C.J.S., 201-209, Libel and Slander, §§ 123-129; 24 HALSBuRy's
LAWS OF ENGLAND, (Lord Simonds Ed. 1958) 72-74, Libel and Slander,
§ 4, subsection 126.
22McQuire v. Western Morning News Co., Ltd., (1903) 2 K.'B. 100.
The leading American case so holding is the Maryland case of Negley
v. Farrow, Supra, n. 17. See also 14 M.L.E. 221, Libel and Slander, § 41.
'See Comment, Fair Comment, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 1207, 1209-1210 (1949).
As to the difficulty of justification in Maryland, see Note, The Effect
of a Plea of Justification in a Libel Suit, 13 Md. L. Rev. 357 (1953).
Campbell v. Spottiswoode, 8upra, n. 12. Joynt v. Cycle Trade Pub. Co.
[1904] 2 K.B. 292.
1E.g., Merry v. Guardian Printing Co., 79 N.J.L. 177, 74 A. 464 (1909).
'RESTATEMENT,
TORTS (1938) § 606 (2), p. 275, see text infra, n. 36.
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an attack on the private citizen, or follow one, otherwise
the subject of criticism, into his private life. 29 This is
somewhat tempered by the modern rule which includes
so much
of one's private character as affects his public
30
duty.
(c) The publisher cannot be actuated by malice. This is the situation in those classes of defenses to defamation which require a proper purpose. Malice here means
actual or express malice, or where it is with wanton disregard to the rights of the plaintiff.8 '
(d) Comment may be severe. - Comment when it is
severe does not negative the defense.12 While it can serve
as evidence of malice, it is not malice ipso facto.3 3
(e) To be fair comment, it must be supported by facts
correctly stated, or referred to on the face of the comment,
or so within the common
knowledge of the reader as to
34
make the comment fair.
Knowledge of facts either stated or presupposed is generally considered to be another element of fairness, because
if facts upon which comment is based are not known to
the reader, he possesses no criterion with which to determine the fairness of the comment. Most courts agree that
all the facts, as long as they are referred to, do not have
to be contained within the four corners of the article.35 The
main issue in the Kirby case, however, was whether facts,
though not stated or referred to in the article, but otherwise known to the public, were admissible as evidence of
fair comment.
2Snyder v. Fulton, 34 Md. 128, 6 Am. Rep. 314 (1871) ; Triggs v. Sun
Printing & Pub. Ass'n, 179 N.Y. 144, 71 N.E. 739 (1904) ; Post Publishing
Co. v. Moloney, 50 Ohio St. 71, 33 N.E. 921 (1893).
Comment, 8upra, n. 19.
" Ryan v. Wilson, 231 Iowa 33, 300 N.W. 707 (1941). A. S. Abell Co.
v. Kirby, 227 Md. 267, 284-285, 176 A. 2d 340 (1961). "Punitive damages
were allowable only if the jury found the publication to have been malicious
and wanton and that malice need not necessarily imply Ill will or hatred
but in law will exist if the editorial was recklessly written without reasonable justification or excuse." (Emphasis added.) See also, Brinsfield v.
Howeth, 107 Md. 278, 68 A. 566 (1908).
"Mere exaggeration, slight irony, or wit, or all those delightful touches
of style which glo to make an article readable, do not push beyond the
limitations of fair comment. Facts do not cease to be facts because they
are mixed with the fair and expectant comment of the story teller, who
adds to the recital a little touch of his piquant pen." Briarcliff Lodge
Hotel v. Citizens-Sentinel Publishers, 260 N.Y. 106, 183 N.E. 193, 198 (1932).
"Berg v. Printers' Ink Pub. Co., 54 F. Supp. 795 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff'd,
141 F. 2d 1022 (2d Cir. 1944) ; Kulesza v. Chicago Daily News, 311 Ill.
App. 117, 35 N.E. 2d 517 (1941) ; Merivale v. Carson [1887] 20 Q.B.D. 275.
"See Court's discussion in A. S. Abell Co. v. Kirby, 227 Md. 267, 273-274,
176 A. 2d 340 (1961).
53 C.J.S. 211, Libel and Slander, § 131.
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The defendant relied upon Section 606 of the Restatement of Torts to support its contention that facts were
admissible. That section states in part as follows:
"(1) Criticism of so much of another's activities as are
matters of public concern is privileged if the
criticism, although defamatory,
(a) is upon,
(i) a true or privileged statement of fact, or
(ii) upon facts otherwise known or available
to the recipient as a member of the public,
and
(b) represents the actual opinion of the critic, and
(c) is not made solely for the purpose of causing
harm to the other.
(2) Criticism of the private conduct or character of
another who is engaged in activities of public concern, in so far as his private conduct or character
affects his public conduct, is privileged, if the criticism, although defamatory, complies with the requirements of Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Subsection (1) and, in addition, is one which a man
of reasonable intelligence and judgement might
make."3
The defendant also relied upon a similar statement from
Harper and James in their work on torts. 7 The Court did
not specifically reject these statements; rather the majority
indicated that they were more appropriate in situations
where the subject matter of the comment was more obviously well known.3
8RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1938)
'1

§ 606, p. 275.

HARPEM AND JAmES, TEE LAW OF TORTS (1956)

§ 5.28, p. 458-459.

"[l]t follows that criticism is privileged as fair comment only when
the facts on which it is based are truly stated or privileged or
otherwise known either because the facts are of common knowledge
or because, though perhaps unknown to a particular recipient of the
communication, they are readily accessible to him. If the facts criticized or commented upon are not stated or known, fair comment is
no defense. The reason for this rule, of course, is this: an opinion
must be based on facts; if the facts are not known, the opinion
carries with it the implication of facts which will justify it."
8This seems evident from the Oourt's discussion Kemsley v. Foot, [1952]
A.C. 345, noted in 68 Law Q. Rev. 294 (1952); 34 New Zeland L.J. 337
(1958), on which the defendant relied. There the defendant printed an
editorial criticizing a well known newspaper. The article was entitled
"Lower than Kemsley"; however, Kemsley, the plaintiff was not mentioned
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The Court concluded that in the situation presented by
the principal case it was necessary for the facts to either
be stated or referred to in connection with the comment.
This was so because from the content of the article there
was nothing which would indicate to a reader that there
were other facts upon which the comment was based. The
Court stated:
"There is nothing in the editorial to lead the reader to
reasons why the writer thought Kirby was infamous
or a man with a motive, or why the reader should. The
linking of his name to Forrester and Ford was not a
sufficient reference to the record relied on by the publisher, and there was nothing in the editorial to lead
the reader to that search of the newspaper archives
which would have been required to reconstruct that
record."3 9
There is no case authority specifically discussing
whether facts otherwise known should be admitted in the
type of situation involved in the Kirby case.4" Most secondin the article itself. On the basis of the import of the heading and the
subject matter of the article, the House of Lords found implied a sufficient
substratum of facts indicated to allow facts generally known about Kemsley's press to go to the jury on the issue of fair comment. The Court
of Appeals distinguished this case from the principal case on the basis
that by referring to the Kemsley press it was the same as literary criticism
of a book and was impliedly referred to, thereby giving the reader a
criterion on which to base the criticism.
3A. S. Abell Company v. Kirby, 227 Md. 267, 284, 176 A. 2d 340 (1961).
' In rejecting defendant's assertion that facts otherwise known be admitted, the court cited a number of cases but only discussed two New
York cases, which state that in order to have fair comment the statement
must be: "(1) comment, (2) based on facts truly stated or referred to,
(3) free from imputations of corrupt or dishonorable motives .

.

. save

in so far as such imputations are warranted by the facts truly stated,
and (4) the honest expression of the writer's real opinion." Cohalan v.
New York Tribune, Inc., 172 Misc. 20, 15 N.Y.S. 2d 58, 60 (1939) (emphasis
added). See also Foley v. Press Publishing Co., 226 App. Div. 535, 235
N.Y.S. 340, 351 (1929). The Maryland Court quoted this statement in
support of the proposition that facts upon which an opinion is based must
be actually stated or referred to and not merely otherwise known in order
to constitute an element of the defense of fair comment. However, the
issues in those cases were on matters of pleading a special form of
defense - in particular, the controversial "rolled-up plea," which presents
different problems from those in the present case.
The "rolled-up plea" is typically stated as follows: in so far as the
words complained of constitute statements of fact, such statements are
true, and in so far as they are expressions of opinion, they are fair comment made in good faith, without malice, on matters of public interest.
Cohalan v. New York World Telegram Corp., 172 Misc. 1061, 16 N.Y.S. 2d
706 (1939) ; Sutherland v. Stopes [1925] A.C. 47. See Anno. Pleading or
raising defense of privilege in defamation action, 51 A.L.R. 2d, 552, 556,
575 (1957). This plea has caused two problems. One is whether it raises
more than one defense, i.e., truth, justification, and/or fair comment.
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ary authorities on their face seem to support the defendant's position,4 but perhaps because of the lack of any
primary authority, they do not discuss exactly what situations should be covered. Since the only basis of appeal
on this issue was the specific instructions given by the
trial judge, it could be argued that the Court did not
necessarily establish a broad general rule. If a case arose
where comment was made on facts which, though not
stated or referred to in the article, were clearly so well
known that the judge could, for example, take judicial
notice of them, it is possible that they could be used as a
basis for a fair comment defense.
ROBERT W.

BAKER

Most courts have decided it raises only the defense of fair comment.
Foerster v. Flynn, 193 Misc. 373, 84 N.Y.S. 2d 297 (1948), comment,
Use of the Rolled-up Plea in Libel Action, 49 Col. L. Rev. 583 (1949) ;
Sutherland v. Stopes, supra. This is the main point discussed in the Foley
and Cohalan cases, supra. The other point is how much is the defendant
required to distinguish fact from opinion in the bill of particulars. See 49
Col. L. Rev. 583 (1949) supra. It is the dissents contention that these
cases do not preclude the use of facts otherwise known. 227 Md. 267, 289,
176 A. 2d 340 (1961) ("But even if these decisions are followed, it does
not require the result reached by the majority, as shown by the following
quotation from Cohalan v. New York Tribune, Inc., 172 Misc. 20, 15
N.Y.S. 2d 58, one of said decisions, when the court, in sustaining the
sufficiency of a plea of fair comment, said: 'On the basis of the facts
stated in the editorials and the other facts alleged in the defenses a jury
might find that the conclusions and comment contained in the editorials
were within the realm of fair comment'.")
The other cases cited do not deal directly with the issue involved:
Merivale v. Carson, 20 Q.B.D. 275 (1887) severity of criticism; Parsons
v. Age-Herald Pub. Co., 181 Ala. 439, 61 So. 345 (1913) report of grand
jury as privileged occasion; State Press Co. v. Willett, 219 Ark. 850, 245
S.W. 2d 403 (1952) false statements of fact and malice; Howard v.
Southern California Associated Newspapers, 95 Cal. App. 2d 580, 213 P.
2d 399 (1950) opinion as distinguished from fact; Eikhoff v. Gilbert, 124
Mich. 353, 83 N.W. 110 (1900) considered fairness of statement; Edmonds
v. Delta Democratic Publishing Company, 230 Miss. 583, 93 So. 2d 171
(1957) was privilege abused by malice; Leers v. Green, 24 N.J. 239, 131
A. 2d 781 (1957) no claim that facts otherwise known should be admitted.
-But see O'Brien v. Salisbury, 54 J.P. 215 (1889) for a good discussion of
facts otherwise known as applied to slander.
"GATELY, LIBEL AND SLANDER (4th Ed. 1953) 622, 624; 1 HARPER AND
JAMES, THE LAW OF ToRTs (1956) § 5.28, p. 456; NEWELL, SLANDER AND
LIBEL (4th Ed. 1924) § 483, p. 521; ODGERS, LIBEL AND SLANDER (6th Ed.
1929) 515-516; RESTATEMENT, ToRTs (1938) § 606, p. 275; 62 Harv. L. Rev.
1207, 1211 (1949); 22 Va. L. Rev. 642, 658-659 (1936); 14 Notre Dame
Lawyer 270, 278 (1938-39) ; 18 Aust. L.J. 158, 160 (1944-45).

